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“Fellow-brethren and compeers”:
Montaigne’s Rapprochement Between Man and
Animal
Markus Wild
With the words “confreres et compaignons” (“fellow-brethren and com-
peers”)1 Montaigne addresses the animals at the beginning of his famous
defence of the reason of animals in his rambling essay “An Apologie of
Raymond Sebond”, written in the 1570s. By addressing us as animals
Montaigne is, in fact, much more polite than in his first address to us,
where he addresses human beings in the following way: “The natural,
original distemper of Man is presumption. Man is the most blighted
and frail of all creatures and, moreover, the most given to pride.”2 An im-
portant proof of our presumption and vanity consists in the fact that we
allocate capacities and abilities to the animals as we portion out pieces of
food to our pets and livestock. As Montaigne puts it, vanity
makes him equal himself to God; attribute to himself God’s mode of being;
pick himself out and set himself apart from the mass of other creatures ; and
(although they are his fellows and his brothers) carve out for them such help-
ings of force or faculties as he thinks fit.3
For, by what kind of evidence do we deny language, reason, understand-
ing, culture, or morals to animals?4 “How can he, from the power of his
1 The translation “fellow-brethren and compeers” is John Florio’s. For conven-
ience, however, all references to Montaigne’s Essays are to the page numbers in
the translation by Screech 1993, and to the page numbers in the French edition
by Villey, revised by Saulnier 1965. The chronological layers of the texts are not
indicated as they play no role in my argument.
2 “La presomption est nostre maladie naturelle et originelle. La plus calamiteuse et
fraile de toutes les creatures, c’est l’homme, et quant et quant la plus orgueil-
leuse.” (II, 12, 505/452).
3 “C’est par la vanit de cette mesme imagination qu’il s’egale  Dieu, qu’il s’attrib-
ue les conditions divines, qu’il se trie soy mesme et separe de la presse des autres
creatures, taille les parts aux animaux ses confreres et compaignons, et leur dis-
tribue telle portion de facultez et de forces que bon luy semble.” (II, 12, 505/
452).
4 For an excellent discussion cf. Serjeantson 2001, 425–444.
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own understanding, know the hidden, inward motions of animate crea-
tures? What comparison between us and them leads him to conclude
that they have the attributes of senseless brutes?”5 As an out and out Pyr-
rhonian sceptic, Montaigne questions the alleged evidence and tries to es-
tablish arguments in favour of the reason of animals. And he does so in
order to counterbalance the arrogative human assumption of being
among living creatures the only creature with a rational soul.
This, of course, marks an important shift in the history of human
self-understanding. One very important and essential feature (and I
would claim: the most important and the most essential feature) of
human self-understanding consists in the distinction between man and
animal, in the anthropological difference.6 And this very difference is com-
monly associated with having or not having a rational soul or mind. In
this way, then, Montaigne approaches the animal to man. He does so
by allowing the animal a stance, a perspective of its own on the world.
This kind of rapprochement and this acknowledgment of a perspective
are best captured in Montaigne’s famous saying: “When I play with
my cat, how do I know that she is not passing time with me rather
than I with her? [ed. 1595] We entertain ourselves with mutual mon-
key-tricks. If I have times when I want to begin or to say no, so does
she.”7
I have presented Montaigne’s arguments in support of animal reason in
other places,8 and I have defended a Phyrronian interpretation of Mon-
taigne elsewhere as well.9 In what follows, however, I want to take a look,
5 “Comment cognoit il, par l’effort de son intelligence, les branles internes et se-
crets des animaux? par quelle comparaison d’eux  nous conclud il la bestise
qu’il leur attribue?” (II, 12, 505/452).
6 Cf. Wild 2006. For an excellent discussion of ancient philosophy cf. Sorabji
1993. For a more extended view cf. Steiner 2005.
7 “Quand je me joue  ma chatte, qui sÅait si elle passe son temps de moy plus que
je ne fay d’elle. [d. 1595] Nous nous entretenons des singeries reciproques. Si
j’ay mon heur de commencer ou de refuser, aussi a elle la sienne.” (II, 12,
505/452)
8 Cf. Wild 2006, 43–123; Wild 2009, 141–159. Cf. also Gontier 1998. Classical
studies for the early modern period are Boas 1933; Hester 1936; Rosenfield
1940. They are, however, basically misleading, for they either do not take Mon-
taigne into account and focus on the animal-machine-debate only or they treat
Montaigne exclusively as a satirist.
9 Cf. Wild 2000, 45–56; Wild 2009, 109–134. For different or opposing per-
spectives on Montaigne’s scepticism cf. Strowski 21931; Dumont 1972; Limbrick
1977, 67–80; Schiffman 1984, 499–516; Laursen 1992; Tournon 2000, 45–
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so to speak, at the other side of the same coin, since not only does Mon-
taigne approach (and thus liken) the animal to man, he also approaches
human beings to animals. But before I begin with the main subject of
my talk, let me emphasize that some of my more salient expressions so
far are not meant to be unduly metaphorical or figurative. What I am
hereby referring to are expressions like ‘addressing the animal’, ‘rap-
prochement between man and animal’, ‘acknowledging a perspective of
its own’ or ‘approaching the animal to man’. To illustrate this I will briefly
digress to an example closer to us in time than the early modern essayist’s
assemblage of zoological lore taken from ancient literature. Nevertheless,
I consider this example to be very Montaigneian in spirit. Moreover, I
mean to indicate in this way that I consider Montaigne’s voice to be ad-
dressing us today.
I. Addressing the animal in a Montaigneian spirit
The example is about gorillas. The first scientific description of the go-
rilla originated in 1847 and would set the pattern for a hundred years,
when most of the encounters with gorillas took place. On the one
hand there is a description of the animal that is very similar to us, on
the other hand, gorillas are said to be exceedingly ferocious, and always
offensive in their habits. The only scientist in the 19th century to produce
a long-term study of the gorilla was Robert Garner in 1896. Intimidated
by the supposedly ferocious nature of the gorilla, he built a portable cage
he could see through on all sides. Thus protected, Garner spent 112 days
in the African jungle, waiting for the gorilla. One day a young gorilla
came close to the cage and took a peep. Garner writes:
He stood for a time, almost erect, with one hand holding on to a bough; his
lower lip was relaxed […], and the end of his tongue could be seen between
his parted lips. He did not evince either fear or anger but rather appeared to
be amazed.10
62; Brahami 2001; Hartle 2001; Levine 2001; and (of course) Popkin 2003.
Historically, there is a close connexion between sceptical thinking and animal
thought, cf. Floridi 1997, 27–57.
10 Garner 1896, 239.
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Who wouldn’t? In the first half of the 20th Century the hunters and col-
lectors came.11 The hunter Carl Akeley is reported to have said: “The
white man who will allow a gorilla to get within ten feet of him without
shooting is a plain darn fool.”12 But then, something changed. In 1959
George Schaller went to Africa in order to study the Mountain Gorilla.
Schaller had a very simple and very courageous idea, namely to advance,
sit, and remain in full view. He increased his visibility and trustworthiness
by moving slowly, by wearing the same clothes, by roaming alone, and by
never chasing the animals.13 He was able to have a full view of the goril-
las, because they could inspect the alien clearly, because they could watch
and approach him, and because they could get acquainted with him. Un-
like his predecessors, Schaller granted the gorilla a perspective of its own.
And his better known successor, Dian Fossey, even started addressing the
gorillas.14 One way to bring out the Montaigneian spirit of my gorilla ex-
ample is a variation on the famous question I quoted a moment ago:
When I watch the gorilla, how do I know that he is not watching me
rather than I am watching him?
Another way to characterize Schaller’s attempt of rapprochement is
this: he wanted to counterbalance our tendency to consign animals to
the mercy of our cultural imagination. Unfortunately, this attempt has
led recent Cultural Animal Studies in a wrong direction. Here is an ex-
ample of what I have in mind: “Animals do not mean anything; they
are nothing more than that which the viewer sees; they do not, in them-
selves, symbolize or signify anything else.”15 Taken in one sense, this
seems correct. Yet, in another sense it does not. Animals do mean some-
thing, and they are more than what the viewer sees. I know of no external
thing that symbolizes or signifies anything else in itself. Signs, words, ges-
tures, drawings, etc. signify something, yes, but they are made to mean
11 The four officially approved gorilla subspecies of today were named after their
killers and collectors. The colonial types of the missionary (Thomas S. Savage),
the man at arms (Robert von Beringe), the merchant (Herr Diehl), and the hunt-
er (Rudolf Grauer); cf. Meder 1995. In 1929, a first surge of interest in the nat-
ural behaviour of the gorilla brought biologist Harold Bingham to the Congo.
But his deficiency in training, his army of porters, trackers, and assistants, com-
bined with the elusive nature of gorillas, resulted in complete failure and in poor
photographs of shadowy, distant gorillas ; cf. Bingham 1923, 1–66.
12 Quoted in Schaller 21964 , 10. For more on gorilla history cf. Dixson 1981, 1–
10.
13 Cf. Schaller 1963.
14 Cf. Fossey, 1983.
15 Mullan /Marvin 1987, 124.
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something by something or (rather) by someone else. They do not signify
in themselves, their meaning is derived. Their meaning is derived from
our uses and from our thoughts, desires, purposes, intentions and so
on. But now it seems that the way the animals themselves can mean
something is at the mercy of our meanings. And this is just the line of
thought Montaigne attacks when he says that man “carves out for the an-
imals such helpings of force or faculties as he thinks fit.” In a Mon-
taigneian spirit we should say the following instead: the meaning of
thoughts, desires, purposes, intentions and so on is not derived from
other meanings, it is original meaning. We mean something by using
symbols, and we mean something by having thoughts. And clever and so-
cial animals mean something by producing signs, and they mean some-
thing by having thoughts, desires, purposes, intentions.16 Therefore, clev-
er and social animals such as gorillas mean something. They have a view
of the world. In this sense, they are not at the mercy of our meaning.
(They are at our mercy in a different way.)
What about ‘rapprochement’? Usually, the expression ‘attempt a rap-
prochement’ is used in political, belligerent, or war-like contexts. The
context of the comparison in my example certainly was, and still is,
war-like. Montaigne’s attempt at a rapprochement between man and an-
imal took place in an extraordinarily belligerent context, too. From an-
other point of view, in what sense does Montaigne approach and thus
liken the human to the animal? I can approach this question by focussing
on a contrast in the concept of ‘anthropology’. On the one hand there is
the idea that anthropology is a project aimed at the exploration of univer-
sal human nature; on the other hand, there is the idea that anthropology
is concerned with the investigation of cultural and ethnic differences. An-
thropology in the first sense seems to emphasise constant, universal, de-
fining features of human nature, whereas anthropology in the second
sense seems to emphasise contingent, cultural, and self-defining features
of different communities. How do these two ways of conceiving of
human beings relate to each other?17 The way Montaigne would accom-
16 For a discussion of animal mentality and cognitive ethology cf. Allen /Bekoff
1997; Bekoff /Allen /Burghardt 2002; Bermudez 2003; Daston /Mitman
2005; Hurley /Nudds 2006; Wild 2008.
17 The difficulty with the question is intensified by taking up strong positions and
by forcing the juxtaposition into outright policies of confrontation. Such was, for
example, the case with Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of
Human Nature (2002). Inspired by poor natural science, Pinker holds, for exam-
ple, that the way children turn out is almost wholly unaffected by how their pa-
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modate both views is by invoking the concepts of a first nature and a sec-
ond nature (mostly by implication, but literally in one important pas-
sage).
II. Experience, habit, and custom: the idea of a second nature
The basic idea is simple and goes back to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics.
In his account of the acquisition of virtue of character Aristotle argues
that it takes habituation for virtue to evolve, since virtue is not naturally
given, but is based upon natural tendencies that are realized through ha-
bituation. He says: “Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do
the virtues arise in us, rather we are adapted by nature to receive them,
and are made perfect by habit.”18 Acquiring certain characteristics by ed-
ucation, learning, and habituation is surely natural for all human beings.
Our capacities for imagination, action or thought are natural insofar as
they depend on our biological endowment (on our first nature) and in-
sofar as they are acquired during the normal human developmental proc-
ess. They are part of second nature because we can acquire them only by
being initiated into a specific cultural tradition. Second nature can be un-
derstood as an actualization of potentialities that belong to human ani-
mals. All human beings are endowed with the potentialities for the ac-
quisition of habits of thought and action, and (if all goes well) they do
acquire a second nature. That is our way of being an animal.19 However,
there is a problem about different forms of a second nature. By what
standards do we compare culturally different ways of life? The answer,
in short, is : by our first nature; by the fact that we are, like the other an-
imals, vulnerable, fragile, mortal bodily creatures. In the remainder of my
paper, I will try to explain this idea. Let me start with Montaigne’s under-
standing of the Aristotelian idea of a second nature.
rents bring them up. Human beings are viewed as Pleistocene-minded creatures
wondering how they got lost in contemporary mega-cities. But surely, this is ab-
surd. And it seems equally absurd to think, inspired by poor cultural studies, that
the way children turn out is nothing but an effect of parental speech acts and the
effects of biopolitics, phono-, logo-, ocular- or whatsoever-centrism.
18 EN II 1, 1103a23–26.
19 In contemporary philosophy it is John McDowell who has brought the notion of
second nature to the fore again, cf. McDowell 1996, chap. 4; “Two Sorts of Nat-
uralism”, in: McDowell 1998, 167–197.
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Interestingly, Montaigne develops the idea of the necessity of a second na-
ture in the course of launching a critique against Aristotle. At the begin-
ning of the essay “Of experience” Montaigne says: “No desire is more
natural than the desire for knowledge. We assay all the means that can
lead us to it. When reason fails us we make use of experience”20 This
opening evidently refers to the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics : “All
men by nature desire to know.” The beginning of Aristotle’s work implies
that man is the one who actively seeks for knowledge. More precisely,
knowledge is the perfect actualization of human nature. Montaigne, how-
ever, seems to imply that the desire for knowledge is more akin to a driv-
ing force. Man is driven by his desire for knowledge. This way of putting
the matter allows, first, for the question of whether the quest for knowl-
edge is a good thing in itself (why should a fact about a natural tendency
have normative force?), and it allows for the further question of whether
it is possible for man to gain knowledge in the first place. I will not go
into the first question here. Instead, I will take up the second question.
More precisely, this question is concerned with whether it is possible
for man to gain knowledge from experience.
Of course, we do have experience and experiences in a very common-
sense way. Montaigne is eager to describe his way of experiencing things,
people, happenings, or events. But how could this mundane notion of ex-
perience provide a basis for knowledge in a more demanding way? Let us
take a look at the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. According to Ar-
istotle all our knowledge begins with sense-experience. The senses discern
things and qualities, and this kind of information is stored in memory.
The memories of certain things and qualities constitute man’s experience.
This experience is the foundation of the practical arts and the sciences.
The practical arts build on generalisations extracted from experienced
similarities between things or qualities. The sciences, however, are more
demanding, because they are searching for the true causes of the general-
isations just mentioned. But Montaigne doubts the possibility of general-
ising from experience:
The induction [consequence] which we wish to draw from the likeness be-
tween events is unsure since they all show unlikeness. When collating objects
no quality is so universal as diversity and variety. As the most explicit exam-
ple of likeness, the Greeks, the Latins and we ourselves allude to that of eggs,
20 “Il n’est desir plus naturel que le desir de connoissance. Nous essayons tous les
moyens qui nous y peuvent mener. Quand la raison nous faut, nous y employons
l’experience.” (III, 13, 1207/1065).
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yet there was a man of Delphi among others who recognized the signs of
difference between eggs and never mistook one for another; when there
were several hens he could tell which egg came from which. Of itself, unlike-
ness obtrudes into anything we make. No art can achieve likeness.21
In order to be able to generalize from experience we have to be able to
compare the objects of experience. But how is this supposed to work if
these objects are dissimilar, different, and always changing?22 If experien-
ces are dissimilar, what entitles us to classify similarities and to extract
generalisations from them? (In retrospect, it is easy to see that Montaigne
articulates doubts similar to David Hume’s famous sceptical concerns
about inductive reasoning.) And if experience, on a very plausible as-
sumption, is the basis of practical arts, professions, and science, and
given the fact that most cultures do actually contain forms of practical
arts, professions, and science, how is it possible that experience in the rel-
evant sense is not possible?
In reply to this question, Montaigne attempts to show that we ought
to have some sort of grids or schemes to establish order in, and to gen-
eralize from the unruly multitude of experiences. Generalisation is not
the offspring of experience, rather, experience is the offspring of prior
models or schemes for generalisation. Montaigne calls these models or
schemes ‘customs’ or ‘habits’. He applies both these terms to the habits
and customs of communities and of individuals. Let us focus on the com-
munal application. According to Montaigne it is necessity that unites
human beings, and it is necessary for human flourishing to live in com-
21 “La consequence que nous voulons tirer de la ressemblance des evenemens est
mal seure, d’autant qu’ils sont toujours dissemblables: il n’est aucune qualit si
universelle en cette image des choses que la diversit et la variet. Et les Grecs,
et les Latins, et nous, pour le plus exprs exemple de similitude, nous servons
de celuy des oeufs. Toutefois il s’est trouv des hommes, et notament un en Del-
phes, qui recognoissoit des marques de difference entre les oeufs , si qu’il n’en
prenoit jamais l’un pour l’autre; et y ayant plusieurs poules, sÅavoit juger de la-
quelle estoit l’oeuf. La dissimilitude s’ingere d’elle mesme en nos ouvrages; nul
art peut arriver  la similitude.” (III, 13, 1207 f./1065)
22 Montaigne expresses the same concern for human judgment when he says:
“Never did two men ever judge identically about anything, and it is impossible
to find two opinions which are exactly alike, not only in different men but in the
same men at different times.” / “Jamais deux hommes ne jugeront pareillement de
mesme chose, et est impossible de voir deux opinions semblables exactement,
non seulement en divers hommes, mais en mesme hommes  divers heures.”
(III, 13, 1210/1067).
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munities.23 Such communities are the origin of the habits and customs
which furnish their members with certain ways of experiencing the
world. In other words, they furnish them with a specific form of a second
nature. Through the Essais Montaigne expresses this in several ways. He
says that it “is for custom to give shape to our lives, such shape as it will –
in such matters it can do anything.” Or he says that “we have to take men
already fashioned and bound to particular customs”.24 The actualization
of potentialities belonging to human animals is determined by communal
customs and habits. This kind of (let us say) ‘habitalism’ or ‘usualism’ is
aptly captured in the expression ‘second nature’. In the juridical usage of
the Renaissance the expression is very wide in scope and “covers custom-
ary law, local mores, folk memory, popular consensus, even culture in
general”.25 As Montaigne himself puts it: “Custom is a second nature
and no less powerful.”26
Thus, Montaigne suggests that habits and customs lead to certain
models of perception and schemes for experience, and these allow for
similarities in and for generalisations from experiences. Human beings
are brought up by being drilled, trained, and educated to notice some sa-
23 Cf. III, 9, 1083/956.
24 “C’est  la coustume de donner forme  nostre vie, telle qu’il luy plaist ; elle peut
tout en cela.” (III, 13, 1226/1080) and “nous prenons les hommes obligez desj
et fromez  certaines coustumes.” (III, 9, 1083/957).
25 Maclean 1992, 173.
26 “L’accoustumance est une seconde nature, et non moins puissante. Ce qui man-
que  ma coustume je tiens qu’il me manque.” (III, 10, 1142/1010). There is a
serious complication to all this. Montaigne doesn’t think that second nature is
always beneficial : “But the principal activity of custom is so to seize us and to
grip us in her claws that it is hardly in our power to struggle free and to come
back into ourselves, where we can reason and argue about her ordinances.
Since we suck them in with our mothers’ milk and since the face of the world
is presented thus to our infant gaze, it seems to us that we were really born
with the property of continuing to act that way.” / “Mais le principal effect de
sa puissance, c’est de nous saisir et empieter de telle sorte, qu’ peine soit-il en
nous de nous r’avoir de sa prinse et de r’entrer en nous, pour discourir et raison-
ner de ses ordonnances. De vray, parce que nous les [les coutumes] humons avec
le laict de nostre naissance, et que le visage du monde se presente en cet estat 
nostre premiere veu, il semble que nous soyons nais  la condition de suyvre ce
train.” (I, 23, 130/115) Here I would have to explain, how reflective criticism it
possible, and I would also have to explain how we arrive at an individual second
nature. It is by travelling and reading. Literature and travel give a second nature a
second chance, so to speak. But this is beyond the scope of my present concern.
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lient similarities that have been useful for a certain way of life. And there
are, of course, different forms of life.
This last idea is confirmed by the tales from the New World. And for
this reason the discovery of the New World is so exciting for Montaigne.
Here he finds a very different and rather strange form of life, showing
that a second nature can take very different forms given different habits
and customs. It is well known that Montaigne tends to praise the inhab-
itants of the New World. But the deeper reason for this noble-savage-kind
of praise lies in the fact that, in Montaigne’s account of the New World,
the imagination “turns not toward fantasies of ownership and rule”27 but
toward comparison and shame. The “horreur barbaresque” of New World
cannibalism serves as a means of articulating the horror at home.28 For
Montaigne writes in his essay on the cannibals :
It does not sadden me that we should note the horrible barbarity in a practice
such as theirs ; what does sadden me is that, while judging correctly of their
wrong-doings we should be so blind to our own. I think there is more bar-
barity in eating a man alive than in eating him dead; more barbarity in lac-
erating by rack and torture a body still fully able to feel things, in roasting
him little by little and having him bruised and bitten by pigs and dogs (as
we have not only read about but seen in recent memory, not among enemies
in antiquity but among our fellow-citizens and neighbours – and, what is
worse, in the name of duty and religion) than in roasting him and eating
him after his death.29
This passage can help us to give an answer to a pressing question that aris-
es when confronted with Montaigne’s view on second nature. This view
seems to imply the consequence that different habits and customs lead to
radically different forms of life. What, then, about the possibility of criti-
cism? What about cultural relativism? As we can learn from the passage
just quoted, the possibility of criticism is given by the possibility of com-
paring different life-forms. As already indicated, Montaigne not only
27 Greenblatt 1991, 150.
28 Nakam 1998.
29 “Je ne suis pas marry que nous remerquons l’horreur barbaresque qu’il y a en une
telle action, mais ouy bien dequoy, jugeans bien de leurs fautes, nous soyons si
aveuglez aux nostres. Je pense qu’il y a plus de barbarie  manger un homme vi-
vant qu’ le manger mort,  deschirer, par tourmens et par genes, un corps en-
core plein de sentiment, le faire rostir par le menu, le faire mordre et meurtrir aux
chiens et aux pourceaux (comme nous l’avons, non seulement leu, mais veu de
fresche memoire, non entre des ennemis anciens, mais entre des voisins et con-
citoyens, et, qui pis est, sous pretexte de piet et de religion), que de le rostir et
manger apres qu’il est trespass.” (I, 31, 235 f./209)
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evaluates the life-form of the inhabitants of the New World, rather he
finds fault at home. He finds fault in the excessive violence and cruelty
of the penal system and of the religious wars. But in analogy to the
case of experience we might ask: by what standards do we compare dif-
ferent life-forms? The answer, in short, is: by our first nature; by the fact
that we are, like the other animals, vulnerable, fragile, mortal bodily crea-
tures. This is the force of Montaigne’s rapprochement of man and ani-
mal; or, if you like, of his ‘animalization’ of human beings.
Let me note in passing, that the form of a solution for the relativity-
problem in contemporary philosophy is centred not upon animality, but
upon language. Something is a language, as Donald Davidson would say,
only by the possibility of translation. There is, therefore, no radical in-
commensurability between languages, and, accordingly, no incommen-
surability between different ways of viewing the world and life. Or as
Hans-Georg Gadamer would put it: Every language contains all other
languages, there is, therefore, the possibility of a fusion of horizons. It
seems to me that Montaigne’s solution should not be disregarded because
of the contemporary interest in ourselves as linguistic creatures.
III. The first to put cruelty first : the idea of a first nature
Let me explain the idea of the ‘animalization’ of human beings by looking
at Montaigne’s central ethical essay “On cruelty”. Here we find Mon-
taigne’s central moral insight: “Among the vices, both by nature and by
judgment I have a cruel hatred of cruelty, as the ultimate vice of them
all”30 Montaigne is (as Judith Shklar expresses it) putting cruelty first.31
Cruelty, in its most basic sense, is the activity of deliberately hurting sen-
tient beings. The torture of humans and animals are paradigmatic cases of
cruelty.32 It concerns animals and humans alike, it concerns us and them
30 “Je hay, entre autres vices, cruellement la cruaut, et par nature et par jugement,
comme l’extreme de tous les vices.” (II, 11, 480 f./429) There is a question con-
cerning Montaigne’s “cruel hatred of cruelty”. This is not a paradox. Montaigne
is saying that the pitying of victims of cruelty might contain a quantum of cruelty
itself. Cruelty is a cunning vice that will also be found in virtuous dispositions,
such as pity.
31 Cf. Hallie 1977, 156–171; Shklar 1984, 1–44. For Montaigne’s role in modern
moral philosophy cf. Schneewind 1988, 42–57; Schneewind 2005, 207–228.
32 Cf. Shklar 1984, 8: Cruelty is “the willful inflicting of physical pain on a weaker
being in order to cause anguish and fear”.
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as frail complexes of vulnerable and perishable tissue. Montaigne insists
that the first seeds of cruelty are spread in early childhood, and that
they flourish by habit and by lack of counteraction.33 He explains that,
not unlike anger, cruelty spreads and inspires imitation.34 To him the ha-
tred of cruelty is an even greater motivation toward benevolence than any
model of virtue could ever be.35 Cruelty is an ordinary and cunning vice
that is also to be found in virtuous dispositions, such as pity.36
Before Montaigne, there had been no such strong and explicit reac-
tion against cruelty in general. Why? As Daniel Baraz has pointed out
cruelty is a marginal issue for early medieval thinkers and theologians.37
This changes to some extent in the late middle ages. But the concern with
cruelty was mainly restricted to three topics: There is, first, Christian
martyrdom. Cruelty is considered a trait in pagans, Jews, or heretics out-
side the Christian community. They may inflict harm on the martyr’s
body, but they will not harm his soul. The pain of martyry is analogous
to the pain of surgery because both kinds of pain are salutary. In the same
way the martyr suffers a sancta crudelitas, the castigated heretic suffers
cum crudelitate clementi. There is, second, the problem of excess or sever-
itas in the lawful punishment by the prince. In this context, cruelty is seen
as an exclusively penal topic. And there are, third, the cultural others.
Cruelty in the medieval context is most often deemed an ‘achievement’
of foreign, heathen, belligerent peoples, such as Vikings, Mongols, or
Turks, who topically excel in carnage, massacre, sexual violence, and can-
nibalism.
It is crucial that cruelty is seen to come from outside. Even in accounts
of the alleged cruelty of heretics, peasants, or Jews, cruelty is exclusively
attributed to cultural others. Such ascriptions of cruelty authorize severe
punishment. But severe punishment in these cases is not deemed to be
cruel, since the punisher’s intention is not cruel, as torturing and killing
cruel persons is not in itself cruel. Accordingly, tormenting the body in
order to save the soul cannot be considered cruel.
We are now in a position to understand why cruelty in this context
can not be the worst thing we do. The first reason is simply: We are
not cruel. The others are. The notion of cruelty simply does not apply
33 Cf. I, 23, 124/110.
34 Cf. III, 13, 1205/1063.
35 Cf. III, 8, 1045/922.
36 Cf. III, 1, 892/791.
37 Barraz 2003.
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to us. A second reason is that, in a strictly dualistic picture of the human
being (having a body and a soul) the infliction of bodily torments is
judged differently. Montaigne’s animalization of man accentuates our
bodily nature, in strong contrast to this picture. There is, however, a
third reason. You can judge an action morally with an eye on the inten-
tions or with an eye on the consequences. The more you concentrate on
the consequence of an action affecting another human being, the more
you concentrate on the affected body. In this picture, the infliction of
pain cannot be disregarded. In sum: once cruelty is not to be found in
the cultural other alone but amongst us, once the separation of body
and soul is questioned, and once you attend to the consequences of ac-
tions, cruelty can come to the fore. And it very much did so in the
16th Century.
In the course of the religious wars in France the very notion of cruelty
became a domestic one. It existed (in Montaigne’s words) “entre des voi-
sins et concitoyens”.38 A parallel circumstance can be observed in an ex-
cessive concern with cruelty in print. Suffering Protestants invented what
might be called a ‘propaganda of cruelty’. John Foxe, for example, writes:
“For as the papists and Turks are alike in their religion; so are the papists
like, or rather exceed them in all kinds of cruelty that can be devised.”39
Jean de Lry reports in his Histoire d’un voyage en terre de Brsil from
1578 on the cruelty of cannibals, which is widely outdone by the cruelty
of the Spaniards, which he compares to the cruelty that French Catholics
inflict on his fellow Protestants. Though Foxe and de Lry find cruelty in
their culture, cruelty is still reserved for others, and certain forms of cru-
elty are deemed relatively excusable. In clear contrast, Montaigne reacts
against cruelty in general. Cruelty is unconditionally vicious, and there
is no excuse for cruelty by comparison. Because of their bodily nature
cruelty concerns all human beings (and animals). There is no legitimate
target for cruelty.
Montaigne begins his essay on cruelty by considering virtue conceived
of in a certain way, namely as a way of ruling the passions and the appe-
tites. Virtuous persons control their passions and appetites by reason.
Montaigne contrasts the virtue of Socrates and the virtue of Cato the
Younger, both models of virtuous men. Nevertheless, he attributes to
both men some sort of cruelty against themselves, because their attempt
at ruling their passions is a form of internalised cruelty. But if cruelty is
38 Cf. Crouzet 1990; Zemon Davis 1973, 51–91.
39 Foxe 1583, VI, 7.
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the worst thing to exert, and if it is the most detestable vice, then these
men should not serve as models at all.
IV. Taking pleasure in virtue
The contrast between Socrates’ easy virtue and Cato’s austere virtue is in-
teresting in our context. Take the rigorous, grim and unsparing exercise of
virtue in the case of Cato. Cato lives up to the idea that virtue is its own
reward. So, if virtue necessitates your losing your freedom, your posses-
sions, your limbs, eyes, tongue, mental faculties or your life, this is no
loss to the virtuous. This, of course, is the masculine and aristocratic
yearning for control or the short life of glory Montaigne attacks in his
essay. Take the contrast between a strong willed person and a virtuous
person. The strong willed one does the right thing but does not want
to, and struggles when doing what is right. The virtuous one does
what is right and wants to do it, he faces no internal struggles here.
The ease with which the latter performs right action and the pleasure
he or she takes in virtuous action are part of what makes him or her good.
One should note the important role of pleasure in living well. The
idea here is to have us contrast the person who does what is right as a
matter of self-interest with the person who does what is right out of a
love of virtue. Someone who is moved to act rightly out of a love for vir-
tue is more consistently going to take pleasure in right action. In contrast,
the person who acts rightly out of self-interest may often view doing the
right thing as the lesser of two evils. The virtuous person who sees virtu-
ous action as good in itself and who takes pleasure in the performance of
virtuous deeds is less likely to resent the demands of morality. Conse-
quently, for him or for her a life of right action is more likely to be pleas-
ant. And for us the lover of virtue is a more reliable companion.
So, the virtuous and the strong willed, the virtuous and the vicious,
the aristocrat and the peasant, the Protestant and the Catholic, the
Frenchman and the inhabitant of the New World share the ever threat-
ening possibility of death, suffering, disease, and loss. And this is, in gen-
eral, something undesirable and harmful, and pleasure and enjoyment
are, in general, desirable and a human good. Despite all the differences
of second nature, there is an overlap between different forms of life inso-
far as there is an overlap in our first nature, the nature we share with an-
imals. Montaigne stresses the fact that we are, like the other animals, vul-
nerable, fragile, and mortal bodily creatures. But there is still the other
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animal dimension of pleasure and enjoyment. In this way, Montaigne of-
fers a doctrine of the human in the sign of crisis and civil war. He thereby
seeks to establish sets of common values in situations when authority
finds itself under pressure.
How could he? I said that I see Montaigne as a Pyrrhonian sceptic.
But the promotion of doctrines does not seem to fit a Pyrrhonian.
Here we have to remember that Sextus Empiricus answers the famous ac-
cusation of apraxia against the sceptics by reference to four standards of
action. Sextus explains these four practical standards in the following
way:
By nature’s guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking. By
the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst to drink.
By the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from an every day
point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. By teaching of kinds of
expertise we are not inactive in those we accept. And we say all this without
holding any opinions.40
As one can see, Montaigne’s distinction between first and second nature
and his attempt at rapprochement between man and animal in a time of
war and crisis is in no way contrary to his Pyrrhonism. And we will be
able to appreciate why Montaigne thinks that there is nothing in our in-
tellectual inventory in which there is so much likelihood and profit as we
can find in Pyrrhonism.
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